beneficial for society to maintain alternatives to the traditional family, such as foster homes. And third, although most people agree that parents neglect their children for psychological reasons, I
consider the possibility that their neglect is also due to preferring their own consumption over that of their children.
I highlight the paper's major themes-the state's agency problem, the role of in-kind transfers, society's need for alternative families, and parental neglect as a result of parental preferences-by modeling one common form of imperfect parenting: parental neglect. The model shows how the state's agency problem is pervasive, regardless of whether parental and societal preferences are congruent.
The paper has three sections. In Section I, I present data on parental neglect of children which illustrate that it occurs in nontrivial numbers, confirming that the state faces an agency problem too often to be ignored; I also discuss how this neglect conflicts with the state's interest in children's well-being. In Section 11, I highlight the pervasiveness of the state's monitoring problem by modeling neglectful parenting (i.e., parents who lack "altruism" for their children). In Section 111, I summarize the analysis and discuss caveats.
I. BACKGROUND
Parental neglect occurs often enough that the agency problems confronted by states are real.
For example, Table 1 shows that in 1986 there were 2,086,000 substantiated and unsubstantiated reports of child maltreatment.' During the 1980s. the rate of reported child-neglect and abuse cases increased from 18.1 reports per 1,000 children in 1980 to 32.8 reports per 1,000 children in 1986.
Most revealing for the purposes of this paper is that maltreatment consists mainly of "deprivation of necessities." Moreover, by 1984, nearly 50 percent of reported cases came from families receiving 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 Number of children reported (1,000) Rate per 10,000 children Type of maltreatment:
Item
Deprivation single-female-headed families.4 While perpetrators were more likely to be female and in their early thirties, victims were more likely to be preschoolers and females. These data suggest that children in welfaredependent and/or female-headed families are not only more likely to suffer poor school performance and latter welfare dependency themselves (McLanahan and Garlinkel 1986) , but are also more prone to suffer physical deprivation.
Many states augment these types of federal child-neglect data. The Illinois Department of Children and Family Services, for instance, reports statistics for both child neglect and abuse. Table   2 , column 2, shows that in Illinois in fiscal year 1984,6,989 children were indicated to have suffered economic deprivation either through inadequate food, shelter, clothing, or education. Another 12,719 children were indicated to lack supervision; of these, 750 had been abandoned. In addition, in that year, 80 percent of child-abuse and neglect offenders in Illinois were natural parents (State of Illinois, 1984) .
Indeed, all states collect data and publish statistics similar to those by the lllinois Department of Children and Family Services. Table 3 displays the rate of child abuse and neglect for each state and the District of Columbia, indicating the variation across states. Whereas Missouri and Florida reported very high rates in 1986 (58.6 and 50.0 per 1,000 children, respectively), Pennsylvania and ~i s & n s i n reported quite low rates (7.2 and 22.7 per 1,000 children, respectively). Even if the comparability of rates across states is suspect (see note 4), the table still causes one to ask: Why are there huge differentials in rates of abuse and neglect by state? Are such rates related to income maintenance programs and the characteristics of parents eligible for them?
These child-welfare statistics, state and federal, reveal that child neglect occurs in nontrivial numbers; indeed, the very fact that governments spend public funds to gather information about its occurrence, nature, victims, and offenders indicates how serious a problem parental neglect is.
Moreover, states allocate substantial funds to other child-welfare concerns, such as enforcing child Testa and Lawlor (1985) , The State of the Child.
Note: Total harms, number of indicated harms, and percentage of total harms substantiated for specified category. labor laws, devising minimum child-care standards, and compelling parents to present neglected children to authorities.'
Because the majority of parents are altruistic toward their children, they seldom break childneglect laws. As Becker and Murphy (1988) state, "Altruistic parents are good caretakers because they consider the effects of their actions on the welfare of children. They sometimes sacrifice their own consumption and comfort to increase that of children" (p. 4). Altruistic parents, like the state, have strong incentives to see that their children thrive; and so, parents invest time and resources to nurture their children. Moreover, most parents generally share the state's concern that children live in safe environments and receive an education. Hence, since parents and the state's preferences for children usually coincide, most parents are adequate agents to nurture children; they routinely comply with minimum child-care standards, so states rarely need to intervene in families on behalf of children.
The problem for the state occurs only when state and parent concerns for the welfare of children conflict. This conflict becomes apparent ex DO^ because these parents low levels of altruism, which affect the trade+ffs they make between their own consumption and their children's well-being, mean that the state's minimum standards are not met. When the state observes signs that a child is being neglected-like deprivation or lack of supervision-the state will deem that child's parents to be imperfect child-care providers. At this point, the state considers how it will protect and safeguard that child. Initially, at least, it will assess whether the parents are eligible for transfer programs designed to provide children with basic necessities. This conflict between parents and the state is shown formally in Section I1 below.
MODELING PARENTAL NEGLECT OF CHILDREN
Although nearly all parents are altruistic toward their children and w e about their children's futures, some parents are more altruistic than others. Heterogeneity in parental altruism affects the trade3ff all parents must make between their own consumption (and leisure) and investing in their children's human capital .6
For parents who are endowed with given degrees of altruism, the trade3ff between their own consumption (and leisure) and the welfare of their children is formally specified by adapting Becker and Tomes's (1986) intergenerational utility function.
(
where 0 s pi 0 0 .
Equation (1) shows that parents receive utility from their own consumption and leisure, as well as from the future welfare of their children (Ui+,).' The degree to which parents internalize children's welfare (i.e., their degree of altruism) is represented by the parameter 0.' Morealtruistic parents (those with high B values) will give up a lot of consumption now for their children's future welfare. Hence they prefer to allocate relatively more family resources to children's consumption even at a high cost of their foregone money and leisure. Because these parents spend relatively more income on child inputs than what society minimally requires, their children are not regarded as neglected.
Alternatively, negligent parents (those with very low 0 values) will give up little of their current leisure or consumption to raise children. The level of their utility is heavily determined by their preference for their own leisure and consumption. They may still comply with child-neglect statutes, but prefer to allocate relatively fewer family resources to children's consumption so that they can spend more relatively on themselves. These parents may heavily discount the returns to investing 11 in children's future welfare and may believe that when children reach adulthood, they should "fend for themselves." In one sense, some behavioral scientists will label this as deviant behavior. My argument is different, however. I claim that such parental behavior is an outcome of parental preferences. Even if such parental behavior is considered deviant, the point here is how the state induces parents to change their behavior toward their children who are deprived of basic wants.
Providing that less-altruistic parents' level of inputs for children's basic needs meets minimum childneglect standards, society will still consider these parents adequate. State welfare agencies will not intervene dire~tly.~ But the state does have a prima facie reason to protect the future welfare of neglected children, whose parents possess low degrees of altruism. Figure 1 portrays three parents, A, B, and C, who have the same income level but possess varying degrees of altruism. Assume that income level I is the minimum level which allows parents (with normal preferences) to meet society's child-neglect standards. Hence, income level I may be interpreted as society's "poverty line," and the minimum standard "S" is based on inputs that prevent children from neglect.
In Figure 1 , parent C is extremely altruistic, sacrificing a lot of own consumption to spend income on the child. Given income level I, point "c" is chosen by parent C. This parent gives up enough own consumption so that the child's welfare is guaranteed beyond society's minimum standards against child neglect. The case of parent C demonstrates that when parents greatly care about their children's welfare, even if they are poor, child-neglect laws are inconsequential. Parent B, whose opportunity set is the same as parents A and C, is also non-neglectful and chooses point "b"
in Figure 1 . Parent B's preferences lead to the minimum bundle of parental consumption and child inputs which meets society's minimum standards.
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However, the least altruistic parent, parent A, exhibits neglectful behavior by choosing point "a" in Figure 1 . At point "a," society considers the child neglected because at income level I, parent A does not allocate sufficient income to child inputs.
Neglectful parents are assumed to have lower marginal propensities to spend on children's welfare. Neglectful parent A, who prefers an extra hour spent on his own consumption than on his children's consumption, will allocate only a proportion of any welfare agency's cash transfers to the child. If society is committed to children's well-being, it will give neglectful parent A a cash subsidy equal to I-I to ensure that the child has enough inputs to protect him from neglect. With 1-1 additional income, neglectful parent A will choose point "a'" on indifference curve U , ' . Child A's level of inputs will have increased enough to ensure he is no longer neglected. Meanwhile, the value of parent A's increased consumption is equal to G -C , , , .
But if parent A had been more altruistic, the state would not have had to provide as large an incentive to induce him to provide sufficient child inputs. Indeed, the state can provide smaller monetary incentives to any set of neglectful parents whose indifference curves are tangent to constraint "I" on the line segment between point "a" and point "b." These parents are less negligent of (more altruistic toward) their children. Indeed, if parent B received the same cash transfer as parent A, and parent B moves to indifference curve U,', the amount parent B appropriates for his own consumption (&-C*,J is less than what parent A takes for his own consumption. Figure 1 's analysis assumes that parents' incomes are equivalent. Across the income distribution, however, there will be some high-income parents who will have sufficiently low degrees of altruism that they will fail to comply with child-neglect laws. Given that these high-income parents have adequate income to meet children's physical needs, the nature of their neglect may be more psychological in nature.
14 Figure 2 shows the case in which parents D and E have the same low degrees of altruism, but parent D has a higher income. Their respective indifference curves are U, and U , . They currently consume out to C, and COD, respectively. Without state intervention, the children of both parents will have consumption below subsistence level Ci+, at Cdi+, and Pi+,. Parent D wants an income transfer equal to %-COD in order to raise the child's consumption to Ci+,. Figure 2 suggests that the effectiveness and amount of cash transfers needed to increase child inputs will depend upon the degree of parental altruism and also the parent's income.''
Figures 1 and 2 suggest that low degrees of parental altruism inhibit state authorities' abilities to use cash transfers to fully compensate children for their parents' neglectful behavior. When parents with equivalent incomes are not perfectly altruistic and contravene child-neglect laws, the lessaltruistic parents will demand more monetary compensation before they are willing to provide increased inputs for children. In addition, when parents have the same low degrees of altruism but have different income levels, those parents with higher income levels will need less pecuniary gain before they are willing to guarantee children's higher consumption.
Furthermore, when neglectful parents' marginal propensities to spend on children are extremely low, society has a control problem similar to its problem with noncustodial parents (Weiss and Willis 1985) . The state has difficulty monitoring the allocation of negligent parents' (the custodians) expenditures on children and is left with trying to police these neglectful parents' allocations of cash transfers between their own consumption and their children's future welfare.
Because income transfers to neglectful parents are prohibitively costly, and the allocation of these transfers between child investments and parental consumption is impossible to efficiently monitor, the state must rely on alternative policy instruments to safeguard children's welfare. It has to revert to using in-kind transfers and monitoring activities (such as visits by child-welfare authorities) to reduce the probability that children's well-being is neglected.
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The state's agency problem and its reliance on in-kind transfers and monitoring activities is graphically portrayed in Figure 3 . Figure 3 suggests how in cases of extreme parental neglect, welfare agencies are inherently limited in efficiently supporting needy children. Assume that parents A and B are again both constrained by income level I. They possess different degrees of altruism and as such have indifference curves U, and U,, respectively. Both parents presently allocate relatively little time and few resources to their child's consumption. But state authorities at least consider that parent B at point "n" neglects the child's consumption less than parent A neglects his own child's consumption. In fact, parent A's chosen point "m" indicates that so few child inputs are provided that the child is very maltreated. Assume that parent B wants an income transfer equal to C , € , in order to raise the child's consumption to Ci+,. But parent A, who is also poor, is even less altruistic than neglectful parent B. As parent A has an even lower marginal propensity to spend on the child, he wants a larger transfer, equal to &-C, in order to raise the child's consumption to an adequate level. Parent A's lower marginal propensity to spend on the child causes the government to have to provide him with higher income transfers than those given to parent B, if parent A's child is to have consumption comparable to parent B's child.
Given parent A's low marginal propensity to spend income on the child, a state income transfer to the parent to induce him to modify his behavior would be prohibitively costly. Society would have to offer a monetary incentive to the parent equal to cash amount &-C, to enable the child to achieve minimum consumption level Ci+,. Moreover, costly monitoring would still be needed to protect the child from parental neglect.
As in-kind transfers tie to varying degrees parental consumption to investments in children's future welfare, using them instead of income transfers would reduce the state's agency problem by allowing it to more effectively monitor how well a parent provides for the child. Through in-kind transfers and direct state monitoring of needy children, society can generally reduce the probability 18 that children are neglected by parents whom society labels as imperfect agents to rear children. Yet some parents with extremely low D values may force child-welfare authorities to threaten punishments, such as fines, jail terms, or annulment of parental rights, to induce them to comply with child-care standards. In other words, the state may find that regulatory measures are necessary when pecuniary inducements, in-kind transfers, and monitoring of neglectful parents' care of children prove too costly.
Indeed, it may be more efficient to rescind parental rights and place children elsewhere than to expend resources on monitoring children in neglectful parents' households. From the state's perspective, the price it would have to pay otherwise-negligent parents to provide adequately for their children is too high, relative to the price it would have to pay more-altruistic parents. Whether the children are placed with foster parents or in group homes, the cost of either child-care alternative is lower than the amount of income transfers abusive parents will need before they properly care for their children.
When society places children in surrogate homes with more-altruistic caregivers, the parent is unambiguously worse off. Society, however, acts on the assumption that the aggregated gains-gained children's consumption, diminished social costs, and saved monitoring costs-outweigh losses in parental utility.
Moreover, as Figures 1 and 3 
Notes
'States intervene in families on behalf of parents in requiring adolescents to reach a certain age before they can drive, for instance.
This "agency problem" of the state resembles the problem that noncustodial fathers have in influencing the welfare of their children: they can act only indirectly, through their former wives (Weiss and Willis 1985) .
31t is important to note that these data are affected by improvements in state reporting mechanisms, changes in reporting requirements, and growing awareness of child abuse among citizens. Moreover, these numbers cannot distinguish between multiple reports for a child and single reports for all children within a family.
'Again, it must be noted that a child may be enumerated more than once in a year.
%is last activity has already been found constitutional by the Supreme Court; see the Chic= Tribune editorial, "Right decision on child abuse, " February 23, 1990. 6Lazear and Michael (1988) cite the example of Leopold Mozart, who made a great sacrifice for the education of Wolfgang. Leopold allocated family resources unevenly so that his son could pursue a career in music.
?be appendix discusses this functional form and derives the first-order necessary conditions. The importance of I3 to these marginal conditions is apparent.
T h e parameter 8 is constrained between zero and positive infinity. It seems unlikely to observe parents who are sadistic (i.e., have negative 0 values). Yet, some parents may make sacrifices that make their children better off; if so, they will have 0 values greater than 1.0.
Tess-altruistic parents may spend little on chid quality because they raise their children according to the ethic that to "spare the rod is to spoil the child." These parents prefer to provide 
